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aerOS

EUROPEAN IOT-EDGE-CLOUD

D2.5 - DevPrivSecOps methodology specification (2)

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Description	Validation of technologies, tools and environment installed for instantiation of the DevPrivSecOps approach of aerOS		

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Executive Summary

This deliverable D2.5 presents the second and last version of the DevPrivSecOps methodology being designed within the aerOS project. This methodology will allow the internal developers of the project to bring the right practices in the lifecycle of the software developed during the project. Especially, and considering that the DevOps methodology is known and applied by most of the developers, efforts have been directed to the implementation of security and privacy within the DevOps methodology.

In response to the growing emphasis on privacy considerations, aerOS proposes the integration of privacy controls into the existing DevSecOps methodology, leading to the development of DevPrivSecOps. This novel approach aims to advance beyond the current industry standard and will incorporate privacy requirements, enabling aerOS developers to design software that is both secure and privacy-conscious from the beginning of the process.

Considering that a mature version of the DevPrivSecOps methodology was presented in D2.4, this document presents the latest update of the methodology and a guideline on how it should be implemented in the project. It is intended as a guide for aerOS developers and integrators to follow and comply with the DevPrivSecOps methodology defined in the project, thus generating secure and privacy-aware code by design.

Specifically, the DevPrivSecOps methodology designed aims to make project developments secure and privacy-aware by default. To this end, a series of tests have been designed and implemented that are executed automatically and manually to analyse and detect any security or privacy problems that the developed code may have. To implement this methodology, some open-source tools have been selected and some of them have been modified according to the needs of the project. In addition, user guides with examples have been included in the project repository to make it easier for developers to implement the DevPrivSecOps methodology designed in aerOS.

This methodology is intended to teach, not only aerOS developers, but also the entire software development landscape how to implement it. For this reason, the deliverable is public, and anyone interested will have access to it.

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List of acronyms

Acronym	Explanation
AST	Abstract Syntax Trees
API	Application Programming Interface
CD	Continuous Deployment
CI	Continuous Integration
CPD	Continuous Planning Design and development
DAST	Dynamic Application Security Testing
DevOps	Development and Operations
DevPrivSecOps	Development, Privacy, Security and Operations
DevSecOps	Development, Security and Operations
GDPR	General Data Protection Regulation
IDE	Integrated Development Environment
IT	Information technology
JSON	JavaScript Object Notation
OWASP	Open Web Application Security Project
SAST	Static application software testing
SCA	Software Composition Analysis
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
SW	Software
TLS	Transport Layer Security
URL	Uniform Resource Locator
XML	Extensible Markup Language
YAML	Yet Another Markup Language

Table 1 List of acronyms

1. About this document

The main objective of this document is to show how to implement the DevPrivSecOps methodology defined in D2.4 and that will be used in the development and operation of all software created (or used) in the aerOS project. This document aims to guide aerOS developers and users to generate security and privacy by design software. In addition, this document will help to comply with the GDPR regulation both in the development of the components and in the use of these components in the pilots. A set of open-source tools and usage guides are presented to show how to implement the methodology in an easy way, and without the need to pay for specific software.

1.1. Deliverable context

Item	Description
Objectives	This deliverable is directly related with the objective "O3 Definition and implementation of decentralised security, privacy and trust". With this deliverable (D2.5) it is expected to create a cookbook and a good practices manual for the DevPrivSecOps implementation (KVI-3.3). As this methodology will be used to support all software development and operations in the project, it will contribute to reaching the objectives O2, O4, O5 and O6.
Work plan	Deliverable D2.5 presents a guide for the implementation of the methodology defined in D2.4. This document completes the work done in task T2.4 but will continue to support the developments made in WP3 and WP4 and in the deployment of these in WP5, ensuring that the software generated in the project complies with the methodology and is secure and privacy aware.
Milestones	The submission of deliverable D2.5 is directly related to the completion of milestone MS5: Final architecture defined. With the submission of D2.5 together with D2.7, the MS5 is fully achieved.
Deliverables	This deliverable takes as its starting point the D2.4 delivered on M9. With the delivery of deliverable D2.5 the definition of the DevPrivSecOps methodology in the aerOS project is closed.

1.2. The rationale behind the structure

Deliverable D2.5 has been structured as follows:

- **Section 2:** In this section a short introduction has been made to justify the need to create the DevPrivSecOps methodology for the aerOS project.
- **Section 3:** This section presents the final DevPrivSecOps methodology, once the aerOS architecture has been defined.
- **Section 4:** This section presents the toolset that has been selected in the project to implement the DevPrivSecOps methodology. For each of the tools, a usage guide is described.
- **Section 5:** This section presents an example of the implementation of the DevPrivSecOps methodology.
- **Section 6**: Finally, this section presents conclusions.

1.3. Outcomes of the deliverable

- Definition of the final version of the DevPrivSecOps methodology in section 3.
- Toolset to implement the DevPrivSecOps methodology in section 4.
- Guidelines for developers and integrators in section 5.

1.4. Lessons learnt

Task T2.4 has analysed the inclusion of security and privacy controls in the software development lifecycle. This analysis made it possible to select the state-of-the-art tools best suited to the needs of the project, and one tool was even modified to meet the needs of privacy analysis. As a result, the task has generated a simple implementation guide of the defined DevPrivSecOps methodology, automating the different controls as much as possible.

1.5. Version-specific notes

This deliverable, together with D2.4 delivered on M9, completes the series of two deliverables that describe the DevPrivSecOps methodology defined in aerOS. This document has been presented as the continuation of D2.4.

Based on the analysis of the state of the art and the definition of the methodology carried out in D2.4, this document presents the tools and usage guides for each one of them to allow developers and integrators of the project to easily implement the methodology.

2. Introduction

Due to the advances in the different types of attacks and the number of attacks that are carried out daily on systems exposed on the internet, we are currently faced with the need to generate secure and privacy aware code by design.

Security by design principles should be applied during the design phase of a product's development life cycle to drastically reduce the number of exploitable failures before they are introduced to the market for widespread use or consumption [1]. In addition, security must be analysed at every stage of the code development life cycle to achieve a final product free of vulnerabilities and security problems. However, this is not enough, as new attacks (so-called zero-day attacks) are discovered almost every day [2], which means that software components need constant maintenance to be able to correct these newly detected vulnerabilities.

In recent years, the need to protect the personal data that applications use has increased and to this end, several regulations related to data protection have been published. Specifically, in Europe the main regulation for data protection is the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), published in 2016 [3]. It is now widely regarded as a privacy law not only for the EU [4], but for the whole world.

These regulations must be applied to all environments where data is used. Even if during the development of the SW developers do not use any private data, they need to ensure that once the SW is deployed, the operation complies with the above-mentioned regulations. This adds an important requirement for software developers.

In the same way as security, privacy analysis should be carried out in all phases of software development lifecycle. It should be mentioned that a more thorough privacy analysis is performed once the software is running with business data, but as mentioned above, this is not sufficient. This need leads to the evolution of the software development methodology from DevSecOps to DevPrivSecOps. The aim of this is to increase the security and privacy knowledge of developers, testers, and operations staff and increase the partnership of privacy and security experts.

The methodology presented in this deliverable has been designed with the intention of fulfilling objective **O3: Definition and implementation of decentralised security, privacy and trust.** To this end, different methods have been analysed to ensure that the developments carried out within the project are secure and have privacy by design. In addition, a procedure is presented to ensure that the design, development and deployment of the software is done in a secure and privacy-compliant manner. Finally, the toolset that is used in aerOS and how these should be used to achieve this objective is presented. This objective will be completed with tasks T3.4 and T4.5 of the project where components related to security and trust calculation are developed.

The methodology presented in this document has been created dynamically, analysing the requirements gathered from the developments carried out in WP3 and W4 and the deployment designed in WP5, as it can be seen in the interactions depicted in the Figure 1. It should be noted that the inclusion of privacy in the software development lifecycle is innovative.



Figure 1 T2.4 relations with other aerOS tasks and workpackages

The main objective of this document is to guide developers and staff in charge of deploying aerOS components to configure and use the different tools selected to implement the DevPrivSecOps methodology designed in the project. This document has been enriched with examples to facilitate the use of each of the tools.

As a result of the completion of the T2.4 and with the intention of having an easy-to-use documentation for developers and those in charge of deploying aerOS components, in addition to this document a PowerPoint presentation has been generated with the different steps required to implement each tool and a Readme guide has also been uploaded to the project repository along with an example of a complete CI/CD pipeline with the configuration of selected tools.

3. Final aerOS DevPrivSecOps methodology

The term DevOps is a combination of the two terms development and operations, representing a collaborative approach to the tasks that are performed by development and IT operations teams. DevOps is a collection of several tools and practices that help automate and integrate the processes between IT professionals and software. It further focuses on team collaboration, team empowerment, cross-team communication, and technology automation. DevOps can co-exist with IT service management frameworks, Agile software development, project management directives, and other IT infrastructures. DevOps can be simply defined as *a methodology that helps optimizing the process of software development and operation [5]*.

DevSecOps means thinking about application and infrastructure security from the beginning and embedding DevOps with security controls providing continuous security assurance [6]. DevSecOps is a natural extension of DevOps to include security-by-design and continuous security testing by automating some security controls in the DevOps workflow.

By adding tests to the DevSecOps methodology to ensure that privacy can be analysed in all phases of the process, we get the DevPrivSecOps methodology. This methodology aims to generate secure and privacy-aware code from the design phase.

The Figure 2 presents the DevPrivSecOps methodology approach for aerOS, where a sequence of steps describes how it should be implemented from design through development to deployment and monitoring. The steps to be followed are:

1. Continuous planning and tracking for development testing and deployment activities: security and privacy threat modelling.
2. Code using IDE tools and SAST tools plugins integrated into IDE.
3. Commit code in git source version control repository.
4. Integration automation process pulls the source and build the application.
5. Integration automation may run SCA for dependency check and launch SAST tools.
6. Integration automation may run Acceptance, Smoke, Load and Performance Testing, with Unit and Integration Testing for Integration and Security test execution.
7. Integration automation launches Orchestration Platform and Configuration Management for configuration and build deployment at pre-production server.
8. Integration automation may run Acceptance, Smoke, Load and Performance Testing for Application Acceptance and Security and Privacy test execution.
9. Integration automation launches DAST tools for vulnerability scanner, pentesting and exploit tests.
10. Build automation tool uploads tested package to artifact repository.
11. Wait for approval for Production Deployment.
12. Integration automation launches Orchestration Platform for production server configuration and build deployment.
13. Configuration management download tested package from Artifact repository and deploys to production.
14. Integration automation may launch Acceptance, Smoke, Load and Performance Testing and DAST tools for vulnerability scanner, pentesting, privacy test and exploit test at production server.
15. Production server goes live with updated application and continuous operation.
16. Continuous operation with logging, analysis, visualization, and notification tools. Continuous Monitoring: Security Information, Privacy Information, Event Management and DAST tools
17. Continuous feedback through all the stages development, build, integration, testing and deployment tools at different stages of the workflow.

This methodology presented in this section was designed and presented in deliverable D2.4. Since the design of the aerOS architecture was not yet closed, it was decided to leave the design of the final methodology unresolved. Now, with the aerOS architecture defined, the DevPrivSecOps methodology has been updated and the tools that will be used to implement it have been defined. With this, the methodology designed in D2.4, in Figure 2 has been updated with the tools selected in the project to implement it, in Figure 3.



Figure 2 aerOS DevPrivSecOps methodology.



Figure 3 aerOS DevPrivSecOps methodology with tools.

4. DevPrivSecOps toolset implementation

This section presents the different tools used to implement the DevPrivSecOps methodology presented in Section 3 and deliverable D2.4.

Figure 4 shows the CI/CD pipeline that has been designed to implement the methodology and the tools that have been used in each step of this pipeline: GitLab [7], GitLeaks [8], Semgrep [9], SonarQube [10], Retire.js [11], Trivy [12], Flux CD [13], ZAP proxy [14] and GDPR checklist.



Figure 4 aerOS DevPrivSecOps implementation CI/CD pipeline.

Gitlab, in addition to the software version control repository, is in charge of launching the different steps through the CI/CD pipeline configuration. The steps taken to implement the DevPrivSecOps methodology are as follows:

- **Secret Scanning**: GitLeaks has been used to scan if secrets have been included in the code. This tool allows us to analyse the code for privacy compliance, ensuring that user data is not accessible to people who have access to the repository.
- **SAST**: Static testing is performed once the software has been uploaded to the change control repository. These tests allow to analyse the vulnerabilities and security problems that the code may have. Semgrep and SonarQube will be used for this purpose in the project.
- **SCA**: Retire.js has been implemented for the implementation of Software Composition Analysis tests in the project. This test analyses the dependencies of the code, looking for any kind of security risks such as vulnerability dependencies.
- **Container Scanning:** Trivy has been implemented in order to be able to analyse the traceability of containerised components. Since most of the components of the project are containerised, it was decided to implement this test which complements the others.
- **Continuous Deployment:** In aerOS, it has been decided to use Flux CD as the continuous deployment component of the software developed in the project. This SW is dedicated to monitoring the changes in the master branch of the repositories, and when it detects any type of change in these, it updates the component in the production environment of the pilots.
- **DAST:** ZAP has been chosen to perform dynamic tests on the components deployed in the pilot environment. This tool enables security tests to be carried out on the components deployed, thus detecting security flaws in them.
- **GDPR:** In order to analyse GDPR compliance in software development, a check-list has been used in the project to analyse the status of compliance in the different phases.

In the following sections, the tools mentioned, and others that were used to implement the DevPrivSecOps methodology will be analysed in more detail and guidelines for the use of these tools will be provided in the form of examples.

4.1. Collaboration and communication tool: Mattermost

Mattermost is an open-source online chat service mainly focused on companies and organisations. This service, which is hosted on the UPV partner's servers and is publicly accessible through the URL https://mattermost.aeros-project.eu/, allows to create communication channels according to a topic, follow messages through threads or start private conversations with other users. The main purpose of Mattermost in the aerOS project is to offer a robust, secure and highly available communication system between all the partners involved.

Currently, there are more than 30 channels on the aerOS Mattermost organised by theme. Mainly there are channels focused on work packages and tasks. Work package channels are used to share general information about the work package, such as changes in meeting dates, reminders, deliverables, etc. Task channels focus on more technical and developmental aspects between the different partners involved to streamline the exchange of ideas, concepts, etc., and even documentation such as source code, figures, diagrams or schematics. These channels also speed up the programming of the different aerOS components by allowing the teams to maintain direct and uninterrupted communication to improve the integration of the different modules that compose the Meta-OS.

Also, participants in the chats can share code files, and even source code within the messages in a user-friendly way. In addition, these channels have also been used to discuss doubts about the integration of the different modules that compose the main elements of aerOS.

Another Mattermost feature is the possibility to use threads within conversations. This allows not to divert the main attention of the channel and to focus the threads on more specific topics or technical aspects about a specific question, component or technology. In this way, the main conversation of the channel can be followed in a better way, avoiding the saturation of messages and notifications.



Figure 5 Channels organization and example of a channel for developers.

The work packages and tasks that have associated channels in Mattermost are those that are more technical and developmental, such as WP2, WP3, WP4 and WP5 or all the tasks of WP3 and WP4, and some of WP2 and WP5. However, there are also channels focused on specific topics, such as those focused on specifying the

aerOS Glossary, channels related to security, data, integration, infrastructure, specific technologies or one specifically for communications from the aerOS code repository, GitLab (see Section 4.2). In this channel, requests for access to the system, requests for permissions to the different repositories or the different problems that may arise in the platform are managed. In addition, the pilots also have their own communication channels to speed up the implementation of modules and integrations of their systems with the aerOS architecture.

Finally, it is possible to create channels on demand, in case a partner or group of project partners need a specific communication channel for a specific topic or technology that does not exist before in Mattermost. The channels that are created can be public (any registered user can participate in them) or private (only invited participants can access them). This way it is possible to have, for instance, private groups for developers to accelerate pending integration tasks among software development teams.

4.2. Source version control and CPD: GitLab

Section 9.2 of the previous D2.4 explained in detail that self-hosted Gitlab was selected as the best solution for managing source code repositories in aerOS, which also includes additional functionalities such as CI/CD support, container images registry and installation packages registry, among others. Therefore, a dockerized instance of the Community Edition version of GitLab, which is being constantly being updated to avoid security issues, was installed in the private infrastructure of the UPV partner. This Gitlab repository can be accessed through the public URL https://gitlab.aeros-project.eu/, as well as its API, and the container registry of aerOS (registry.gitlab.aeros-project.eu).



Figure 6 aerOS project private Gitlab.

In a project like aerOS with a large number of partners, which is translated into more than 100 registered users in Gitlab, it was identified the need of defining a clear and transparent strategy to organize the code, projects or repositories in Gitlab and to manage the access permissions. Therefore, it was decided to create a group for each task to include all the software developed within the scope of that task. Task leaders are assigned with a *Maintainer* role (higher permissions), whereas task participants are assigned with a *Developer* role. Moreover, a private group has been created for each partner to speed up internal developments and content sharing without the need for an additional tool.

Finally, in the deliverable D5.2, issue of software packaging when having such variety of code developments and repositories was explained, so it was decided to create a common repository to establish a common packaging and deployment procedure for all the software developed in the project. This repository takes advantage of the container and package registry provided by Gitlab.

4.2.1. CI/CD

Gitlab provides full support to incorporate CI/CD pipelines in the software development and delivery process. Specifically, as described in D2.4, in Gitlab the CI/CD process is performed by a runner, which runs a series of jobs listed in a YAML file (the *.gitlab-ci.yaml* file, which is located in the root path of a Gitlab code repository) and reports their final results to Gitlab in order to show them to the final user in a user-friendly dashboard. Gitlab also allows to run automatic and default pipelines (Auto DevOps) depending on the programming language used in the repository, but this functionality has been disabled to enforce the use of defined pipelines in the scope of the aerOS DevPrivSecOps methodology.

For self-hosted Gitlab installations, these runners need to be configured manually. Therefore, in aerOS it has been decided to take advantage of the cloud infrastructure provided by the partner CloudFerro (CF), which actually is a cloud computing services provider, to install and configure a common Gitlab runner to be used by all Gitlab users. First, a dedicated Linux VM was set up to install the Gitlab runner that will be responsible of running the different jobs that compose a Gitlab pipeline, which are always instantiated on demand according to the repository configuration. Before creating a runner, the associated executor must be selected. The Docker executor has been selected for the common runner in the aerOS project because it provides the full set of Gitlab executor capabilities such as a clean build environment for each build and easy runner migration to other machines in case of failure. Finally, a group runner was created in the Gitlab dashboard following the official documentation.

```
root@gitlab-runners:/home/eouser# gitlab-runner list
Runtime platform                                    arch=amd64 os=linux pid=1573818 revision=f5da3c5a version=16.6.1
Listing configured runners                          ConfigFile=/etc/gitlab-runner/config.toml
runner_1                                            Executor=docker Token=glrt-q_RAH8qDEFsAsn1gPqmg URL=https://gitlab.aeros-project.eu
```

Figure 7 aerOS common runner in the CF's dedicated VM



Figure 8 aerOS common runner configuration in the Gitlab dashboard.

In addition, the usage of Gitlab runners in aerOS is not only limited to the provided runners from the CF cloud environment, but also it is open for the partners to add their own runners. For instance, NCSRD partner has added its own Gitlab runner with a Kubernetes executor, which is different from the Docker executor associated with the CF runner. The aforementioned roles and permissions management allows the selection and configuration of the available runners in each Gitlab group, so that depending on the kind of CI/CD jobs, they can be executed in different runners installed on private partners premises, which is compliant with the spirit of Privacy and Security of the aerOS DevPrivSecOps methodology. For instance, a job which interacts with sensitive data from a pilot will be executed in a runner controlled by pilot participants.

4.3. SAST

Static Application Security Testing (SAST) refers to using automated tools for code analysis. The goal of SAST is not to replace manual code reviews but to be used in parallel to automate basic code checks. SAST helps in identifying vulnerabilities during the development phase in a short time and without the need for specialized personnel. SAST is designed to work in conjunction with other techniques like Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) and Software Composition Analysis (SCA) to ensure comprehensive application security throughout the development lifecycle. Integrating SAST into DevPrivSecOps can be particularly effective because it combines the strengths of both practices. SAST tools can be used as part of the automated CI/CD pipeline to scan new code commits for vulnerabilities. This integration ensures that every piece of code is tested for security before it is merged into the main branch and deployed. There are various opensource and commercial tools each one different from the others, but most of them perform two main tasks:

Transformation of the code into an abstract model: SAST tools generally take as input the source code of an application and convert it into an abstract representation for deeper analysis. Many tools in order to depict the code use Abstract Syntax Trees (AST), although some may use different, proprietary structures. This transformation is essential because it enables the analysis of code to be independent of language. This ensures that security vulnerabilities are not missed due to the nuances of language-specific features not being accurately captured.

Analysis of the abstract model for security issues: Different analysis techniques are used to search for potential vulnerabilities. The most relevant analysis techniques are:

1. Semantic analysis: This type of analysis is similar to using grep to search for potentially insecure functions during manual code reviews. Its goal is to identify vulnerabilities related to the use of potentially risky code.

2. Dataflow analysis: This approach focuses on examining how information moves from inputs to potentially risky functions. It tracks the path of data from where it enters the system to where it could cause harm.

3. Structural analysis: This method examines the specific code structures unique to each programming language. This process involves ensuring adherence to best practices in class declarations, identifying unreachable segments of code (known as dead code), properly utilizing try/catch blocks, and avoiding issues related to the use of insecure cryptographic elements like weak keys or initialization vectors

4. Configuration analysis: This process targets flaws in application settings rather than in the code itself. For instance, applications on Internet Information Services use a 'web.config' file, while PHP utilizes a 'php.ini' file for configuration options, with most applications employing some form of configuration file. By examining these configurations, the tool can pinpoint potential enhancements.

5. Control Fow analysis: This analysis evaluates the sequence of operations in the code to detect issues such as race conditions, the use of uninitialized variables, or resource leaks.

SAST can be implemented in various ways depending on the specific needs:

CI/CD Integration: SAST tools can scan for vulnerabilities each time a pull request or merge is executed. This ensures that code is preliminarily secured before it is merged. To avoid delays in the development pipeline, some projects may choose to run SAST scans only at the time of merges instead of on every pull request, preventing a backlog and waiting time for developers.

IDE Integration: Instead of waiting for a pull request or merge, SAST tools can also be integrated directly into the developers' preferred Integrated Development Environments (IDEs). This allows developers to identify and address issues early in the coding process, saving time and enhancing security throughout the project lifecycle.

GitLeaks is a SAST tool to identify secrets hardcoded in the programs that can lead to privacy and security problems. SonarQube is a widely used open-source tool for continuous inspection of code quality. It performs automatic reviews with static analysis of code to detect bugs, code smells, and security vulnerabilities. Semgrep, on the other hand, is a tool designed for performing lightweight static analysis that looks for patterns in code that may indicate security issues, bugs, or anti-patterns. The integration of SAST tools into a DevPrivSecOps framework within GitLab CI/CD pipelines represents a robust strategy for embedding security into the software development lifecycle. This approach not only enhances the security posture of applications but also aligns with modern practices of agile, continuous delivery, and automated deployments. As security threats evolve, so too should the strategies and tools used to combat them, making the continuous improvement aspect of DevPrivSecOps critical to the long-term resilience and success of software development projects.

4.3.1. Secret Scanning: GitLeaks

GitLeaks is a SAST tool for **detecting** and **preventing** hardcoded secrets like passwords, API keys, and tokens in git repositories. This tool allows us to analyse the privacy of the code by identifying any personal data (such as passwords) that is hardcoded in the code uploaded to the repository.

As well as having privacy implications, the inclusion of passwords, API keys and tokens in the code can open a security breach allowing potential attackers to gain access to the application by using them.

To deploy GitLeaks in the repository to be analysed, the configuration shown in Figure 9 needs to be added to the "gitlab-ci.yml" file.



Figure 9 GitLeaks configuration in GitLab.

As shown in the Figure 9, the configuration must define the GitLeaks docker image that must be used to implement the test, the command that must be launched (in the script section) and finally the rule that must be fulfilled to launch the test. In this case, the rule is that the repository to be monitored (testing-2) must have a commit. This rule will automatically launch the GitLeaks test every time a commit is made to the repository being monitored, thus analysing the hardcoded secrets.

Figure 10 shows the result of the successful analysis (no leak found), once a commit has been launched to the repository.



Figure 10 Successful GItLeaks analysis.

To test the correct functioning of the test, the username and password have been included in the .yaml configuration file of the repository. As shown in Figure 11, GitLeaks detects them correctly and the report shows which failures are detected.

Figure 11 GitLeaks functioning test.

The report of the bugs found can also be viewed in the GitLab CI console as seen in Figure 12.

```
$ gitleaks detect --verbose --source .
    ○
    │\
    │ ○
    ○ ▒
    ▒   gitleaks
Finding:     - name: Password_Admin
Secret:
RuleID:      generic-password-detection
Entropy:     0.000000
File:        k8s-infra/suricata-daemonset.yaml
Line:        49
Commit:      1b5c0f1c3df230ee6ca75250a946a44430191ced
Author:      Ramiro Torres Garófalo
Email:       rtorres@s21sec.com
Date:        2024-02-05T16:50:47Z
Fingerprint: 1b5c0f1c3df230ee6ca75250a946a44430191ced:k8s-infra/suricata-daemonset.yaml:generic-password-detection:49
Finding:     value: "Admin Password"
Secret:
RuleID:      generic-password-detection
Entropy:     0.000000
File:        k8s-infra/suricata-daemonset.yaml
Line:        50
Commit:      1b5c0f1c3df230ee6ca75250a946a44430191ced
Author:      Ramiro Torres Garófalo
Email:       rtorres@s21sec.com
Date:        2024-02-05T16:50:47Z
Fingerprint: 1b5c0f1c3df230ee6ca75250a946a44430191ced:k8s-infra/suricata-daemonset.yaml:generic-password-detection:50
```

Figure 12 GitLeaks report in GitLab.

It should be noted that GitLeaks allows to add custom rules to be able to perform specific code analysis. In principle, the default GitLeaks configuration will be used in aerOS, but it will be analysed which specific rules should be included in specific repositories of the project.

Gitleaks provides a way to mitigate the case where we have leaks in our code, so that we can automate this process when we do have leaks.

```
$ gitleaks protect --verbose --source . -f json -r protect_gitleaks.json
    ○
    │\
    │ ○
    ○ ▒
    ▒   gitleaks
1:52PM INF 0 commits scanned.
1:52PM INF scan completed in 27.2ms
1:52PM INF no leaks found
```

Figure 13 GitLeaks report in GitLab.

4.3.2. SonarQube

SonarQube is a source code evaluation platform. It is a free software, and it uses several static source code analysis tools such as Checkstyle [15], PMD[16] or FindBugs [17] to obtain metrics that can help improve the quality of a code.

The continuous code quality inspection offered by SonarQube is used to perform automatic reviews with static code analysis to detect bugs and code smells in 19 programming languages. SonarQube provides reports on duplicate code, coding standards, unit tests, code coverage, code complexity, comments, bugs, and security recommendations.

For the aerOS project, it has been decided to deploy the Docker version of the community edition of SonarQube [18] on a server provisioned for these functions in the project.

SonarQube can be integrated with GitLab, via runners (these are defined as it is explained in the Section 4.2.1).Before the runner can be launched, it must be registered on the machine where SonarQube is installed, so that it can be linked to the GitLab repository where we want to launch the tests (Figure 14). The CI/CD section of the GitLab repository provides the commands and steps to run on the machine.

```
root@runner-sonarqube:~# gitlab-runner register
Runtime platform                                    arch=amd64 os=linux pid=2537 revision=3046fee8 version=16.6.0
Running in system-mode.

Enter the GitLab instance URL (for example, https://gitlab.com/):
https://gitlab.aeros-project.eu
Enter the registration token:
glrt-Y3fKe5e97KKS3Azrc4zt
Verifying runner... is valid                        runner=Y3fKe5e97
Enter a name for the runner. This is stored only in the local config.toml file:
[runner-sonarqube]: runner-sonarqube
Enter an executor: docker, parallels, ssh, docker+machine, instance, kubernetes, custom, docker-windows, shell, virtualbox, docker-autoscaler:
docker
Enter the default Docker image (for example, ruby:2.7):
alpine:latest
Runner registered successfully. Feel free to start it, but if it's running already the config should be automatically reloaded!

Configuration (with the authentication token) was saved in "/etc/gitlab-runner/config.toml"
```

Figure 14 Installation of the runner in the SonarQube machine.

Finally, a project must be created using the SonarQube GUI that is associated with the GitLab repository to be analysed.



Figure 15 Creation of a project for a GitLab repository in SonarQube.

Once everything is installed, the environment variables must be added to the GitLab repository so that it can connect to SonarQube. Finally, a file with the SonarQube properties must be created in the repository.



Figure 16 GitLab configuration for the connection with SonarQube.



Figure 17 GitLab configuration for the connection with SonarQube(2).

Once the runner is configured, every time a commit is made to the repository selected to be analysed, the runner will automatically launch the SAST analysis by connecting to the SonarQube server. The result of the analysis is displayed in GitLab and is also shown in SonarQube's SonarQube user interface (Figure 18).



Figure 18 Successful analysis result in GitLab and also in SonarQube.

In order to analyse the correct functioning of the SAST test, a known vulnerability has been included in the code. In this case, the verification of the certificate of the SSL/TLS connection has been disabled, thus including a vulnerability.

On making the change in the repository, the analysis is automatically launched, and the analysis ends in a failed analysis. The report of the detected vulnerability allows us to identify in GitLab the line of code where the vulnerability is found and also indicates the information of the detected vulnerability (Figure 19).



Figure 19 Vulnerability detection with SonarQube.

4.3.3. Semgrep

Semgrep is an open-source static analysis tool used to help improve the quality of code by detecting bugs, enforcing coding standards and identifying security vulnerabilities. It's a semantic code grepper, meaning it can search code for patterns that look like bugs or coding violations, rather than just matching exact strings. It works with a variety of programming languages, including Python, JavaScript, Go, Java, Ruby and Typescript, and it aims to support more languages in the future.

Semgrep performs scans on a whole project either on-demand or automatically during every build or commit in CI/CD, with all analysis conducted locally. In aerOS, to comply with the principles of DevPrivSecOps, it will be integrated with Gitlab using runners to scan the project's source code for issues.

As in the SonarQube deployment, we must link the runner to the repository that we want to use. The next step is the registration process that allows the runner to access and execute the Gitlab CI/CD pipeline defined in the repository. This pipeline includes the steps to run tests using Semgrep. The Figure 20 shows the runner registration on the system hosting Semgrep in order to run the build jobs and send the results back to Gitlab.

```
gpt@aerOSVM:~$ sudo gitlab-runner register
Runtime platform                                    arch=amd64 os=linux pid=4426 revision=81ab07f6 version=16.10.0
Running in system-mode.

There might be a problem with your config based on jsonschema annotations in common/config.go (experimental feature):
jsonschema: '/runners/0/Monitoring' does not validate with https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-runner/common/config#/$ref/properties/runners/items/$ref/prop
erties/Monitoring/$ref/type: expected object, but got null

Enter the GitLab instance URL (for example, https://gitlab.com/):
https://gitlab.aeros-project.eu
Enter the registration token:
glrt-saK1Pz2sr8x_EwQuWn3K
Verifying runner... is valid                        runner=saK1Pz2sr
Enter a name for the runner. This is stored only in the local config.toml file:
[aerOSVM]: testing_trust
Enter an executor: custom, shell, kubernetes, instance, docker-windows, docker+machine, docker-autoscaler, ssh, parallels, virtualbox, docker:
docker
Enter the default Docker image (for example, ruby:2.7):
alpine:latest
Runner registered successfully. Feel free to start it, but if it's running already the config should be automatically reloaded!
```

Figure 20 Registration of the runner in the Semgrep machine.

Once this is done, we can now move on to configuring the GitLab CI/CD pipeline. In this phase, we need to edit the '.gitlab-ci.yml' file to run SAST using Semgrep. This file allows developers to write specific instructions for GitLab CI/CD on how to build and test their application. If GitLab CI/CD is enabled, every commit to the repository automatically triggers the pipeline described in this file. This configuration specifies what should happen in the GitLab CI/CD pipeline when the code is pushed or merged.



Figure 21 Gitlab CI/CD configuration using Semgrep.

In the Figure depicted above, a job named 'semgrep' has been established within a SAST stage, utilizing the Semgrep tool in a pre-built Docker container to scan Python code for security issues. The results of the scan are stored in the semgrep.json file. This job is specifically configured to run only when changes are made to the

'dev' branch. The pipeline will not fail even if Semgrep finds issues, ensuring continuous integration flow remains uninterrupted.

Once the changes to the '.gitlab-ci.yml' file are committed, the runner will automatically initiate the SAST analysis using the returntocorp/semgrep Docker image to execute Semgrep scans. Figure 22 demonstrates how Semgrep is executed in our repository.



Figure 22 The process of execution Semgrep in our repository.

For demonstration purposes, we have intentionally introduced vulnerable code into our repository to assess Semgrep's detection capabilities. As indicated in the above figure, Semgrep successfully identified the vulnerability and documented it in the semgrep.json file.

To facilitate the understanding of the content within the JSON file, we will upload it to an online interface [19] for analysis.



Figure 23 The results of the semgrep.json in a more readable and structured format.

The JSON reports a security vulnerability in the subtask_software.py file where a call to subprocess.check_output uses *shell=True*. This is risky as it allows shell interpretation of the command,

potentially leading to command injection attacks. The analysis suggests changing the *shell=True* parameter to *shell=False* and handling the command execution without shell interaction.

Overall, the report provides a clear explanation, a suggested fix, and references for further information.

4.4. Container Scanning: Trivy

Although containers provide an efficient and scalable way to develop and deploy applications, they can also present a risk if not operated correctly. Container images that have not been verified or analysed may contain malware, unpatched vulnerabilities or insecure configurations that can be exploited by malicious actors.

For this reason, container image analysis should be an essential element in the software development lifecycle. By systematically scanning and analysing container images prior to deployment, we can identify and remediate any potential threats, thus ensuring a secure and robust environment.

Trivy is an open-source container vulnerability scanning tool. It is very effective at finding vulnerabilities in both container images and dependencies in source code projects. These are the strengths of Trivy:

- **Container image scanning:** Trivy can scan container images for vulnerabilities. It supports several container image formats, including Docker and Kubernetes. It can detect vulnerabilities in operating system packages and libraries included in container images.
- **Project dependency analysis**: Trivy can also scan-source code projects for dependencies. It supports many programming languages and package managers.
- **Vulnerability database**: Trivy maintains an open-source vulnerability database that is regularly updated. This means that we can obtain information about the latest known vulnerabilities.

In order to include the Trivy analysis in the GitLab CI/CD pipeline, it is necessary to add the following lines (Figure 24) in the ".gitlab-ci.yml" file, once the image of the container is builded.

```
scan_image_self-security:
  stage: scan_image
  needs: ["build_image_self-security"]
  image: docker:24
  services:
    - name: docker:24-dind
      alias: docker
  before_script:
    - apk --no-cache add curl python3 py3-pip
    - curl -sfL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/trivy/main/contrib/install.sh | sh -s -- -b /usr/local/bin
    - echo $CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD | docker login -u $CI_REGISTRY_USER --password-stdin $CI_REGISTRY
  script:
    - docker pull "${REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH_SURICATA}:latest"
    - trivy image --exit-code 1 "${REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH_SURICATA}:latest"
  rules:
    - if: '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "testing-2"'
```

Figure 24 Trivy inclusion in GitLab CI/CD.

Once the container image has been generated, Trivy, which has been deployed on the machine where the GitLab runner is configured, will scan this newly created image. It will scan for any vulnerabilities that the image may have, and it will also scan the dependencies that the image has, trying to find any known vulnerabilities in its updated database.

To verify the correct functioning of Trivy, an image with vulnerabilities has been deployed. Specifically, the python3.8-slim image containing known vulnerabilities has been added. As can be seen in Figure 25 and Figure 26 Trivy is able to detect the vulnerabilities.

```
$ trivy image --exit-code 1 "${REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH_ETL}:latest"
2024-03-21T17:31:15.545Z        INFO    Need to update DB
2024-03-21T17:31:15.545Z        INFO    DB Repository: ghcr.io/aquasecurity/trivy-db:2
2024-03-21T17:31:15.545Z        INFO    Downloading DB...
12.97 MiB / 44.48 MiB [----------------->_____________________________________] 29.15% ? p/s ?40.84 MiB / 44.48 MiB [--------------------------
8 MiB [-------------------------------------------------------->] 100.00% ? p/s ?44.48 MiB / 44.48 MiB [-----------------------------------
----------------------------------->] 100.00% 52.58 MiB p/s ETA 0s44.48 MiB / 44.48 MiB [------------------------------------------>] 100.00% 52
--------------------->] 100.00% 49.19 MiB p/s ETA 0s44.48 MiB / 44.48 MiB [------------------------------------------>] 100.00% 49.19 MiB p/s ETA
----->] 100.00% 49.19 MiB p/s ETA 0s44.48 MiB / 44.48 MiB [-----------------------------------------------] 100.00% 25.98 MiB p/s 1.9s2024-03-21T17:
2024-03-21T17:31:18.206Z        INFO    Secret scanning is enabled
2024-03-21T17:31:18.206Z        INFO    If your scanning is slow, please try '--scanners vuln' to disable secret scanning
2024-03-21T17:31:18.206Z        INFO    Please see also https://aquasecurity.github.io/trivy/v0.50/docs/scanner/secret/#recommendation for faster secr
2024-03-21T17:31:19.624Z        INFO    License acquired from METADATA classifiers may be subject to additional terms for [pip:23.0.1]
2024-03-21T17:31:19.624Z        INFO    License acquired from METADATA classifiers may be subject to additional terms for [setuptools:57.5.0]
2024-03-21T17:31:19.625Z        INFO    License acquired from METADATA classifiers may be subject to additional terms for [certifi:2024.2.2]
2024-03-21T17:31:19.627Z        INFO    License acquired from METADATA classifiers may be subject to additional terms for [charset-normalizer:3.3.2]
2024-03-21T17:31:19.628Z        INFO    License acquired from METADATA classifiers may be subject to additional terms for [requests:2.31.0]
2024-03-21T17:31:19.768Z        INFO    Detected OS: debian
2024-03-21T17:31:19.768Z        INFO    Detecting Debian vulnerabilities...
2024-03-21T17:31:19.791Z        INFO    Number of language-specific files: 1
2024-03-21T17:31:19.791Z        INFO    Detecting python-pkg vulnerabilities...
registry.gitlab.aeros-project.eu/wp3/t3.5/self-security/etl:latest (debian 12.5)
==========================================================================
Total: 114 (UNKNOWN: 2, LOW: 67, MEDIUM: 24, HIGH: 20, CRITICAL: 1)
```

Figure 25 Trivy detected vulnerability report.

libsmartcols1	CVE-2022-0563	LOW		2.38.1-5+b1		util-linux: partial disclosure of arbitrary files in chfn and chsh when compiled... https://avd.aquasec.com/nvd/cve-2022-0563
libsqlite3-0	CVE-2023-7104	HIGH		3.40.1-2		sqlite: heap-buffer-overflow at sessionfuzz https://avd.aquasec.com/nvd/cve-2023-7104
	CVE-2024-0232	MEDIUM				sqlite: use-after-free bug in jsonParseAddNodeArray https://avd.aquasec.com/nvd/cve-2024-0232
	CVE-2021-45346	LOW				sqlite: crafted SQL query allows a malicious user to obtain sensitive information... https://avd.aquasec.com/nvd/cve-2021-45346

Figure 26 Trivy detected vulnerability examples.

After researching on the internet, the python:alpine3.19 image has been found to be the alternative without the vulnerabilities and has been changed in the Dockerfile (Figure 27).



Figure 27 Dockerfile update to fix detected vulnerabilities.

Once the change has been made, in Figure 28 it can be seen that Trivy does not detect any vulnerability.



Figure 28 Trivy successful scan.

4.5. Deployment automation: Flux CD

FluxCD is a set of Continuous Delivery (CD) tools and solutions for Kubernetes. CD is a pattern focused on producing, releasing and deploying software in short cycles, following pipelines to ensure it is built, tested and released faster and more frequently.

This allows us to reduce risk and achieve a more consistent delivery of updates, facilitating the testing of changes in a more controlled and incremental manner.

FluxCD provides a GitOps Toolkit to follow the GitOps approach, a way of implementing CD. The concept of GitOps is to have a Git repository that always contains declarative descriptions of the desired state of the infrastructure/application in the production environment and an automated process to ensure that the production environment matches such state. GitOps allows the developer to deploy or update an application by simply updating the associated repository, and the automated process handles the rest, saving time and securing that the repository adequately describes the current state of the application, acting as a single source of truth.

For the aerOS project, the FluxCD solution has been chosen to handle the CD process, due to it fitting with the current Kubernetes infrastructure of the project.

There is a set of core concepts to learn about to properly understand how FluxCD operates, extensively explained in [21].

A **Source** defines the origin of a repository containing the desired state of the system and the requirements to obtain it. For example, a certain branch, a tag, etc. Sources are checked for changes on a defined interval and, if there is a newer version available, an **artifact** is produced.

Artifacts are objects that describe the changes and are consumed by other Flux component to perform actions, such as updating the cluster, to match the desired state.

Reconciliation refers to the process of ensuring that an application within the cluster or infrastructure matches a state as defined in the Source.

A **Kustomization** represents a set of Kubernetes resources that Flux is supposed to **reconcile** in the cluster.

A **Bootstrap** is the process of installing the Flux components in a GitOps manner.



Figure 29 FluxCD GitOps Toolkit.

FluxCD can be integrated with GitLab by applying the following steps[20].

The process begins by generating a GitLab Access Token **with read and write permissions to the API** by accessing the User settings/Access tokens and selecting to create a new token, then export it in the system.



Figure 30 Create Access Token.

```
export GITLAB_TOKEN =<your-token>
```

Before proceeding it can be checked that everything is ready to be ran and deployed. This can be done by flux with the use of `flux check.`

```
root@Ubuntu-desktop:/home/ubuntu# flux check
► checking prerequisites
✔ Kubernetes 1.29.2 >=1.26.0-0
► checking version in cluster
✔ distribution: flux-v2.2.3
✔ bootstrapped: false
► checking controllers
✔ helm-controller: deployment ready
► ghcr.io/fluxcd/helm-controller:v0.37.4
✔ kustomize-controller: deployment ready
► ghcr.io/fluxcd/kustomize-controller:v1.2.2
✔ notification-controller: deployment ready
► ghcr.io/fluxcd/notification-controller:v1.2.4
✔ source-controller: deployment ready
► ghcr.io/fluxcd/source-controller:v1.2.4
► checking crds
✔ alerts.notification.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1beta3
✔ buckets.source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1beta2
✔ gitrepositories.source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
✔ helmcharts.source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1beta2
✔ helmreleases.helm.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v2beta2
✔ helmrepositories.source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1beta2
✔ kustomizations.kustomize.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
✔ ocirepositories.source.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1beta2
✔ providers.notification.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1beta3
✔ receivers.notification.toolkit.fluxcd.io/v1
✔ all checks passed
```

Figure 31 Flux check.

With the token ready, the next step is to run the GitLab bootstrap with the command `flux bootstrap gitlab`.

```
flux bootstrap gitlab \
  --token-auth \
  --hostname=my-gitlab-enterprise.com \
  --owner=my-gitlab-group \
  --repository=my-project \
  --branch=master \
  --path=clusters/my-cluster
```

As an example, here is the configuration used for the aerOS project flux test.

```
flux bootstrap gitlab \
  --token-auth \
  --hostname=gitlab.aeros-project.eu \
  --owner=p26-nasertic \
  --repository=flux-test \
  --branch=master \
  --path=./clusters/my-cluster
```

If everything worked correctly, the Controller pods should have been deployed within the Kubernetes cluster. It may be verified by checking the pods in the `flux-system` namespace.

```
root@Ubuntu-desktop:/home/ubuntu# kubectl get pods -n flux-system
NAME                                       READY   STATUS    RESTARTS      AGE
helm-controller-5d8d5fc6fd-g8d6b           1/1     Running   2 (26m ago)   53m
kustomize-controller-7b7b47f459-cmlrp      1/1     Running   0             34m
notification-controller-5bb6647999-6kdlw   1/1     Running   0             53m
source-controller-7667765cd7-qm88h         1/1     Running   2 (26m ago)   53m
```

Figure 32 Deployed controller pods.

The Flux repository should have also been created with the manifests pushed to GitLab.



Figure 33 Flux repository.

Flux will be tested by integrating it in the self-security component development cycle, which is presented in Deliverable D3.2. To do so, first clone the Flux configuration repository locally. Next, from the repository root, create a **GitRepository manifest** pointing to the self-security repository by executing the following command, which will create a `self-security.yaml` manifest file.

```
flux create source git self-security \
  --url=https://gitlab.aeros-project.eu/p26-nasertic/self-security \
  --branch=develop \
  --interval=1m \
  --export > ./clusters/my-cluster/self-security.yaml
```

The **url** and **branch** parameters dictate the **source** that will be used. Of course, instead of selecting a specific branch, a specific tag or set of tags can be selected.

Finally, commit and push the *self-security.yaml* file to the Flux repository.

```
git add -A && git commit -m "Add self-security GitRepository"
git push
```

With this, a **GitRepository** source has been created for our Flux system to work with.

Next, Flux needs a **Kustomization** so that it knows how to **reconcile** the git repository with the Kubernetes cluster. For this, first use the `flux create` command to create a Kustomization yaml file on the Flux repository.

```
flux create kustomization self-security \
  --target-namespace=default \
  --source=self-security \
  --path="./k8s.info" \
  --prune=true \
  --wait=true \
  --interval=30m \
  --retry-interval=2m \
  --health-check-timeout=3m \
  --export > ./clusters/my-cluster/self-security-kustomization.yaml
```

Note that some of these specs are quite important and should be configured depending on our source. The **source** spec contains the name of the GitRepository source that was just created on the previous step. The **path** spec contains the path within the git repository where the `kustomization.yaml` file will be located with the instructions on how to deploy the application. The **interval** spec dictates how often will flux check for changes on the source.

Commit and push the newly created yaml file to the Flux repository.

As mentioned, the next step will be to create a `kustomization.yaml` in the self-security repository to describe how to deploy and reconcile the application. It should be created in the previously specified route, `"./k8s.info/kustomization.yaml"`, with the following contents:

```
apiVersion: kustomize.config.k8s.io/v1beta1
kind: Kustomization
namespace: default
resources:
  - suricata-suricata.yaml
  - suricata-rules.yaml
  - suricata-daemonset.yaml
```

This resource indicates the namespace in which to deploy the resources, along with the list of resources to create in our cluster. Commit and push the file to the remote repository.

Lastly, Flux needs a manner to authenticate itself with the source repository to be able to pull and apply updates.. To achieve this, a **secret** resource for Git authentication may be created. There are several ways to authenticate, from using a SSH private key, to a bearer authentication token, or a simple HTTPS basic authentication, as described in[21].

For this example, we will use a basic authentication. Create a secret with the `flux create` command.

```
flux create secret git self-security-auth \
    --url=https://gitlab.aeros-project.eu/p26-nasertic/self-security \
    --username=<user> \
    --password=<password>
```

This will create a secret in our cluster that Flux will use for the git authentication.

```
root@Ubuntu-desktop:/home/ubuntu/repos/self-security-nasertic/k8s-infra# kubectl get secrets -n flux-system
NAME                TYPE     DATA   AGE
flux-system         Opaque   2      24h
self-security-auth  Opaque   2      91m
```

Figure 34 Flux secrets.

If everything was done correctly, Flux should start attempting to reconcile the **GitRepository source** with the cluster through the **Kustomization** previously created. This can be confirmed by watching Flux kustomizations with the `flux get kustomizations` command.

```
root@Ubuntu-desktop:/home/ubuntu/repos/self-security-nasertic/k8s-infra# flux get kustomizations --watch
NAME            REVISION                SUSPENDED       READY   MESSAGE
flux-system     master@sha1:0baf2db9    False           True    Applied revision: master@sha1:0baf2db9
self-security   develop@sha1:ce2ab7c2   False   True    Applied revision: develop@sha1:ce2ab7c2
```

Figure 35 Flux customizations.

As we can see, the self-security revision was reconciled and applied correctly.

```
root@Ubuntu-desktop:/home/ubuntu/repos/self-security-nasertic/k8s-infra# kubectl get pods --all-namespaces
NAMESPACE           NAME                                       READY   STATUS    RESTARTS       AGE
default             suricata-vtqmg                             2/2     Running   2 (17s ago)    32s
flux-system         helm-controller-5d8d5fc6fd-g8d6b           1/1     Running   4 (108m ago)   23h
flux-system         kustomize-controller-7b7b47f459-cmlrp      1/1     Running   2 (108m ago)   23h
flux-system         notification-controller-5bb6647999-6kdlw   1/1     Running   2 (108m ago)   23h
flux-system         source-controller-7667765cd7-qm88h         1/1     Running   3 (109m ago)   23h
```

Figure 36 Actualisation of the pods in the cluster.

As expected, the pod *suricata-vtgmg* has been automatically created in the cluster. Making any changes to the repository would now trigger FluxCD to reconcile it with the cluster, thus ensuring that the application state always matches the state of our git repository source.

4.6. DAST: ZAP

Dynamic Application Security Testing (DAST) involves examining a live web application for vulnerabilities by simulating an attacker's approach. It plays a crucial role in the DevPrivSecOps lifecycle. This black-box testing method aims to identify and exploit weaknesses as an actual attacker would, using either manual efforts or automated tools. DAST tests the application from an external perspective, allowing testers to disregard the internal mechanisms of the application and focus on pinpointing vulnerabilities that are most likely to be exploited by attackers. The insights from DAST typically highlight critical vulnerabilities that do not require insider knowledge to exploit, thereby prioritizing issues that need immediate attention. Although DAST is a valuable tool in the security testing, it does not replace other security testing methods. instead, it enhances them.

Integrating DAST into the development pipeline is essential for ensuring application security throughout various phases of software development, and in real-time. CI/CD pipelines streamline the software delivery process by automating tasks like code compilation, running tests, and deploying to production environments. Due to its need for a running application, DAST is optimally used within CI/CD pipelines, where it can effectively test applications in environments that mimic live production settings.

In the DevPrivSecOps, DAST tools are typically employed at multiple stages, especially during and after the development phase. These tools are designed for quick feedback, unlike traditional web application vulnerability scanners that might take hours to complete. This real-time analysis is crucial for identifying security weaknesses that might not be apparent during static analysis or code review.

OWASP ZAP (Zed Attack Proxy) is an open-source web application security scanner. Developed by the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP), it is one of the most popular tools used for testing web applications, helping to identify security vulnerabilities during the development and testing phases of software development cycles.

ZAP provides automated scanners as well as a set of tools that allow you to find security vulnerabilities manually. It is designed to be user-friendly for beginners in application security, yet powerful enough for professional penetration testers. The most important key features of ZAP are:

- **Automated Scanner**: ZAP can perform both active and passive scanning. Active scanning involves ZAP automatically testing the application for vulnerabilities using known attack patterns. Passive scanning, on the other hand, monitors website traffic and analyses it for signs of potential security issues.
- **Intercept Proxy**: This function turns ZAP into a man-in-the-middle-proxy between the tester’s browser and the web application, allowing the tester to intercept, inspect, and modify the traffic passing through.
- **Spider**: It uses a spider to crawl websites and automatically discover new resources (URLs).
- **Scanning**: It can passively scan traffic that passes through it without altering it, and it can also perform active scanning which sends modified data to the server to check for vulnerabilities.
- **REST API**: ZAP includes a REST API for interacting with the tool programmatically, which is useful for integrating ZAP into Continuous Integration namely CI pipelines.

OWASP ZAP is planned to be integrated into aerOS' GitLab repository to scan a running application in accordance with DevPrivSecOps regulations. Like the deployment of the SAST tools, it is necessary to link the runner with the repository intended for use. The registration of the runner will be foregone, as the runner previously registered during the Semgrep deployment will be utilized for testing purposes.

Proceeding with the configuration of the GitLab CI/CD pipeline. In this phase, it is necessary to modify the '.gitlab-ci.yml' file to implement DAST using OWASP ZAP. This file enables developers to specify detailed instructions for GitLab CI/CD on how to build and test their application.



Figure 37 Gitlab CI/CD configuration using ZAP.

Analysing what is depicted in the above figure, within the "dast" stage, there is a job named "zap_baseline" configured to run using the "softwaresecurityproject/zap-weekly" Docker image.

The configuration sets an environment variable, ZAP_TARGET, which specifies the target URL of the web application to be tested. In this instance, the target is the ORION-LD Context Broker, which is running locally on our premises at the URL http://orion:1026/.

The artifacts section specifies that the baseline.xml file should always be saved as an artifact of the build, regardless of whether the job succeeds or fails. This file is essential for reviewing the security findings of the scan and for potentially integrating those results into further stages of the development and security assessment processes.

After committing the changes to the '.gitlab-ci.yml' file, the runner will automatically begin the DAST analysis using the OWASP ZAP Docker image to perform automated scans. Figure 38 illustrates the execution of ZAP in our repository.



Figure 38 Tthe execution process of ZAP in the aerOS repository.

After executing OWASP ZAP, no vulnerabilities were detected in our running application, which attests to the robust structure of our code. In the following figure, the output from 'baseline.xml' is displayed, which contains the results of the security scan, viewed through an online reader.



Figure 39 The output of the baseline.xml through an online reader.

The report header contains metadata about the report itself, this report was generated on Tuesday, 30 April 2024 at 11:37:25.

The body of the XML shows details about the specific site that was scanned, identified by the URL "http://orion:1026". The 'site' tag includes attributes such as 'host' and 'port', which are set to "orion" and "1026" respectively, and 'ssl' set to "false", indicating that the site does not use SSL encryption.

The <alerts> tag within the 'site' section is empty, signifying that no security vulnerabilities were found during the scan of this particular site.

In general, OWASP ZAP effectively scans web applications to detect potential security threats. The lack of alerts in the report implies that the configurations and aspects of the tested web application are secure under the scanning conditions.

4.7. Privacy: GDPR compliance Checklist

The need to analyse privacy during the software development lifecycle has led aerOS to develop a GDPR compliance tool in the software development lifecycle. This tool is based on the GDPR checklist [22] tool and aims to analyse whether the tools developed in the project and specifically the tools used in the pilots comply with this rule. This tool has been modified to meet the specific needs of the aerOS project.

Privacy and especially GDPR compliance is directly related to data and data usage. Therefore, aerOS aims, through this checklist to guide the developers and users of the pilots to comply with this regulation.

The tool is intended to guide developers in the correct use of private data in the different components that interact with them.

For end users, in the case of the pilots in the project, the aim is to analyse the types of data to be used and how they should be used correctly.

This tool has also recommendations on how to comply with the different sections of the GDPR law, thus guiding developers and users to comply with it.

As can be seen in image Figure 40, the use of data within the project is classified into three groups, depending on the different roles that are in charge of the data management:

- *Data controller*: the module in charge of controlling the data processing. In the case of the aerOS project, the Data Fabric oversees managing the continuum data.
- *Data Processor*: the ML models or data processing tools of the pilots are part of this group in the aerOS project.
- *Data subject*: in this case, the data provider is analysed. In the context of the project, all data sources that are connected to the aerOS continuum are analysed in this section.

These roles are assigned to each of the questions asked in the different groups of the checklist: data, accountability and management, new rights, special cases and user rights.



Figure 40 aerOS GDPR compliance checklist.

The checklist is divided into 4 main sections: Data, Accountability and management, new rights and user rights.

- **Data**: By means of this analysis, the aim is to see whether the processing of the pilot data by the Data Fabric complies with the GDPR regulation, or if something needs to be changed in this tool to make it compliant (Figure 41).
- **Accountability and management:** In this section it is analysed that the environment, in this case aerOS, is safe and that any problems are reported to the authorities correctly. This is measured with the checkboxes shown in Figure 42.
- **New rights:** By means of the checklist shown in Figure 43, it is intended to ensure that aerOS users, and in particular data providers to the continuum, are always in control of their data and can modify or delete it at any time.
- **User rights:** This section analyses that the rights of the providers of the data used in the continuum are always complied with. Figure 44 shows the sections to be fulfilled by aerOS to comply with the GPDR regulation.



Figure 41 Analysis of the GDPR in the data.

ACCOUNTABILITY & MANAGEMENT



Figure 42 Analysis of the GDPR in Accountability and management.

NEW RIGHTS



Figure 43 Analysis of the GDPR in new rights.



Figure 44 Analysis of the GDPR in user rights.

This tool will be distributed to all developers together with the 3 cookbooks in the month M21. It will also be distributed to the leaders of each pilot so that they can start analysing the use of the data in the project and take the necessary actions before starting to implement aerOS in the pilots. In addition, in WP5 the pilots will be tracked using this tool until the end of the project to ensure that they are all GDPR compliant.

4.8. Functional framework for MLOps

So far, the focus was on regular software development, the operation in the fields of machine learning (ML) systems needs a special perspective which is often considered as MLOps. Thereby, MLOps can be seen in two ways.

On the one side there is the DevOps view, which now is enriched by the DevPrivSecOps methodology, which focuses on the automated secure privacy compliant handling of software development processes. This methodology needs to be extended in such way that the supporting documentation is not only generated automatically based on code changes, but also is based on the data used in the training, the model performance and additional properties like fairness, and interaction of single ML models with each other in a complex ML system consisting of multiple models. Note, that the overall DevPrivSecOps remains in this field valid.

On the other side there is the literal operation view. Classical software can be operated by monitoring the availability of the service, analyse user feedback, and monitor the utilized resources. However, this is not sufficient for ML systems. Classical software systems are based on rules and therefore one can rely on the assumption that deployed rules always behave the same way. For ML-based software this is not the case. Models that may perform well on one set of data do not necessarily perform equally well on future data. Events like data drift or user drift can cause the system to fail, even though traditional feedback mechanisms may indicate that the system is up and running and all conventional tests have passed as expected.

Consequently, it is necessary to think the development of ML systems different. Especially, due to the high heterogeneity of ML system, the solved use cases, and the available hardware resources. For this, we present a MLOps framework for designing ML systems in such a way that they are tailored to a specific use case but can be extended in case the requirements of the use case change. In addition to designing ML systems, the framework can also be used for documentation purposes allowing to transparently show how different ML

models interact within the system. As the framework uses a functional view, this is even possible without leaking used technologies.

The framework consists of three views. The backbone view, the MLOps view, and the limbs view. The backbone view targets on everything connected on the ML system creating its output. The limbs view focuses on everything used for interfacing with different human roles. The MLOps view is connected to the backbone view as it describes the automated pipelines created the necessary artifacts for the deployment of the components of the backbone. Figure 45, Figure 46, and Figure 47 show the different views.

The backbone view consists of nine modules whereby three are mandatory to create the minimal ML system that consisting of data connectivity, model inference and an API to make the output available to other systems. This minimal setup can be extended by additional building blocks like data validation, which enable the system to determine whether the model is competent enough to give a prediction for a data point. Furthermore, those mandatory modules can be extended by additional modules that are able to detect data drifts, measure performance or embed methods for frugal AI such as active learning depending on the requirements of the use case. Furthermore, the MLOps view structured in such a way, that those steps directly align with the structure of the Backbone view. By this, the code reusability is higher, and the risk of so-called model skew, a gap of the model creating and the deployed model in regards of performance.



Figure 45: Limbs view.



Figure 46: Backbone view for MLOps.



Figure 47: MLOps view.



Figure 48: Legend of the MLOps methodology.

However, giving a raw framework for describe ML systems may not be enough. Therefore, we also present a methodology to determine what modules, building blocks or steps are required for a specific application. For this purpose, the overall process is illustrated in Figure 49, which distinguishes three fields:

- General: Tasks strongly connected to the domain of the use case
- Modelling: Tasks of training and evaluating of ML models
- Operations: Tasks of making the ML models operational

Thereby, the process refers to three different questionnaires for each field:

- General questionnaire: Creates a minimal set of required information about the use case the ML system is supposed to fulfil.
- Backbone questionnaire: Gives for each building block and module a detailed and simple question that supports in the decision whether it is required or desired for the intended ML system.
- MLOps questionnaire: Gives for each step a detailed and simple question that guides the design of the MLOps view.

We do not supply a dedicated questionnaire for the limbs view, as the design of the limbs is a classic case of UX design, a broad and well-studied research field. All questionnaires can be found in Appendix B.



Figure 49: General process of the MLOps methodology.

The results of this process are a standardized, understandable, and extensible functional architecture, that can model simple but also most complex ML systems, It also provides clarification of the most important requirements of the solved use case and clarity about the different functionalities required to successfully implement and deploy the ML system. Those results incorporate the experience from different research areas like explainable AI, frugal AI, or quality testing for ML systems such as testing datasets.

Within aerOS context, we are so far using this methodology for the High-Level Orchestrator's Allocator component which employs AI. As in any deployment of aerOS this AI needs to be maintained, it is crucial to do it in a maximal transparent, robust, and extensible way. Additional ML Systems built within the project are foreseen to use this methodology as well.

5. DevPivSecOps implementation example

The tools presented in the previous step have been chained to form a pipeline. This pipeline has been created with interconnections between the different tools, creating steps and dependencies between them. These dependencies allow to block the execution of the pipeline if one of the tests has not been passed.

. When testing a code with the pipeline, successful completion of all steps allows us to ensure that the deployed code is both secure and privacy aware.

Figure 50 shows an example of the pipeline where the different steps that have been designed to carry out the aerOS DevPrivSecOps methodology can be seen.

Figure 50 aerOS CI/CD pipeline in GitLab.

GitLab is the tool that orchestrates the execution of the different steps of the pipeline. The result obtained in the execution of the different tools in each of these steps can also be visualised in GitLab.

If one of the steps of the pipeline has not been completed succesfuly, the report that the tools exports in GitLab must be analysed and the necessary modifications should be made to the code until the entire pipeline is executed succesfuly. The error log is saved as an artifact by GitLab. This provides insights regarding the cause of the problem detected.

An example of a CI/CD pipeline where the aerOS DevPrivSecOps methodology is implemented is presented in Annex A. It is intended to implement a pipeline for each module developed in the project, following this example presented in the annex.

This execution together with the GDPR compliance analysis through the checklist will allow to ensure that all the code generated and deployed in aerOS complies with the defined security and privacy requirements.

6. Conclusion

The main goal of aerOS is to design and build a virtualised, platform-agnostic meta operating system for the IoT edge-cloud continuum. aerOS will: (i) offer common virtualised services to enable orchestration, virtual communication (network-related programmable functions), and efficient support for frugal and explainable AI and the creation of distributed data-driven applications; (ii) expose an API to be available anywhere and anytime (location-time independent), flexible, resilient and platform agnostic; and (iii) include a set of services and infrastructural features that address cybersecurity, reliability and manageability.

This set of functionalities that aerOS offers must be developed in an efficient and error-free manner so that the whole system can function without any problems.

The methodology presented in this deliverable, together with the guidelines of the usage of each of the selected tools, will allow aerOS developers to build secure and privacy aware by design software components, thus meeting the needs of the market.

The methodology has been developed in a first phase, presented in deliverable D2.4 and defined in a final version in D2.5 once the aerOS architecture has been fixed. In addition to including components to ensure security and privacy in aerOS developments, this latest version of the methodology has added a description of how MLOps is being used as part of the DevPrivSecOps methodology in the project. This part of the methodology helps to automate the needs of the ML algorithms developed within the project.

Emphasis should be placed on the fact that through the different controls that have been implemented in the methodology for analysing the privacy compliance of the developed code, the state of the art has been improved. A complete analysis of privacy and especially GDPR compliance will be performed for the pilot implementations in WP5, using the developed tool.

To monitor the implementation of the methodology across various project developments, its usage will be analyzed in Work Package 5 (WP5), providing support to address any doubts that developers and deployment managers may have when deploying code in pilot environments.

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A. aerOS DevPrivSecOps CI/CD configuration example

In this appendix we have included an example of a CI/CD pipeline configuration that allows the implementation of the DevPrivSecOps methodology defined in task T2.4. It is expected that developers will use this pipeline as an example to implement in the project's code repositories.

```
variables:
  GIT_SUBMODULE_STRATEGY: recursive
  PUSH_IMAGE: "true"
  BUILD_ARGS: "kafka sqlite"
  SCAN_IMAGE: "false"
  EXTRA_TAGS: "${CI_COMMIT_TAG}"
  CONTEXT_DIR_ETL: "k8s-infra/Docker_image_files/etl"
  REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH_ETL: "${CI_REGISTRY}/wp3/t3.5/self-security/etl"
  CONTEXT_DIR_SURICATA: "k8s-infra/Docker_image_files/suricata"
     REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH_SURICATA:    "${CI_REGISTRY}/wp3/t3.5/self-security/self-
security"
  DOCKER_FILE_NAME: "Dockerfile"
  DOCKER_HOST: "tcp://docker:2375"
  DOCKER_TLS_CERTDIR: ""

stages:
  - secret_scanning
  - sast
  - sca
  - build_image
  - scan_image
  - deploy
  - dast

gitleaks:
  stage: secret_scanning
  image:
    name: zricethezav/gitleaks
    entrypoint: [""]
  script:
    - gitleaks detect --verbose --source . -f json -r detect_gitleaks.json
  allow_failure: true
  artifacts:
    when: always
    paths:
      - detect_gitleaks.json
  rules:
    - if: '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "develop"'

gitleaks_protect:
```

```
  stage: secret_scanning
  image:
    name: zricethezav/gitleaks
    entrypoint: [""]
  script:
    - gitleaks protect --verbose --source . -f json -r protect_gitleaks.json
  allow_failure: true
  artifacts:
    when: always
    paths:
      - protect_gitleaks.json
  dependencies:
    - gitleaks
  rules:
    - if: '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "develop"'

njsscan:
  stage: sast
  needs: ["gitleaks_protect"]
  image: python
  before_script:
    - pip3 install --upgrade njsscan
  script:
    - njsscan --exit-warning . --sarif -o njsscan.sarif
  allow_failure: true
  artifacts:
    when: always
    paths:
      - njsscan.sarif
  rules:
    - if: '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "develop"'

semgrep:
  stage: sast
  needs: ["gitleaks_protect"]
  image: returntocorp/semgrep
  variables:
    SEMGREP_RULES: p/javascript
  script:
    - semgrep ci --json --output semgrep.json
  allow_failure: true
  artifacts:
    when: always
    paths:
      - semgrep.json
  rules:
    - if: '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "develop"'
```

```
sonarqube-check:
  stage: sast
  needs: ["gitleaks_protect"]
  image:
    name: sonarsource/sonar-scanner-cli:5.0
    entrypoint: [""]
  variables:
    SONAR_USER_HOME: "${CI_PROJECT_DIR}/.sonar"
    GIT_DEPTH: "0"
  cache:
    key: "${CI_JOB_NAME}"
    paths:
      - .sonar/cache
  script:
    - sonar-scanner
  allow_failure: true
  rules:
    - if: '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "develop"'

sonarqube-vulnerability-report:
  stage: sast
  script:
    - apt-get update && apt-get install -y curl
                        -          'curl          -u          "${SONAR_TOKEN}:"
"${SONAR_HOST_URL}/api/issues/gitlab_sast_export?projectKey=selft-
security&branch=${CI_COMMIT_BRANCH}&pullRequest=${CI_MERGE_REQUEST_IID}"   -o   gl-
sast-sonar-report.json'
  allow_failure: true
  rules:
    - if: '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "develop"'
  artifacts:
    expire_in: 1 day
    reports:
      sast: gl-sast-sonar-report.json
  dependencies:
    - sonarqube-check

retire:
  stage: sca
  needs: ["gitleaks_protect"]
  script:
    - echo "SCA ..."

build_image_self-security:
  stage: build_image
  needs: ["njsscan","semgrep","sonarqube-vulnerability-report","retire"]
  image:
    name: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.14.0-debug
```

```
    entrypoint: [""]
  script:
    - |
      if [[ -z "${REGISTRY_USER}" || -z "${REGISTRY_PASSWORD}" ]]; then
        REGISTRY_USER=${CI_REGISTRY_USER}
        REGISTRY_PASSWORD=${CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD}
        unset CI_REGISTRY_USER; unset CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD;
      fi
    - |
      if [ -z "${REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH_SURICATA}" ]; then
        echo "ERROR: CI variable REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH_SURICATA is mandatory."
        exit 1
      fi
    - REGISTRY=$(echo ${REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH_SURICATA} | cut -d / -f 1)
    - |
      KANIKO_CONTEXT_DIR_SURICATA=${CI_PROJECT_DIR}/${CONTEXT_DIR_SURICATA}
    - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
    - |
              echo    "{\"auths\":{\"${REGISTRY}\":{\"auth\":\"$(printf    "%s:%s"
"${REGISTRY_USER}"     "${REGISTRY_PASSWORD}"     |     base64     -w0)\"}}}"     >
/kaniko/.docker/config.json
    - |
      if [ "$(echo ${PUSH_IMAGE} | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')" = "true" ]; then
        PUSH_IMAGE=""
      else
        echo "Info: defer pushing image to remote as PUSH_IMAGE is false"
        PUSH_IMAGE="--no-push"
      fi
    - |
      if [ -n "$EXTRA_TAGS" ]; then
        IMAGE_WITHOUT_TAG=$(echo ${REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH_SURICATA} | cut -d : -f 1)
        for tag in $EXTRA_TAGS; do
                        KANIKO_EXTRA_TAGS="${KANIKO_EXTRA_TAGS}    --destination
${IMAGE_WITHOUT_TAG}:${tag}"
        done
      fi
    - /kaniko/executor
      --context "${KANIKO_CONTEXT_DIR_SURICATA}"
      --dockerfile "${KANIKO_CONTEXT_DIR_SURICATA}/${DOCKER_FILE_NAME}"
      --build-arg optional_dependencies="${BUILD_ARGS}"
           --destination   "${REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH_SURICATA}"   ${KANIKO_EXTRA_TAGS}
${PUSH_IMAGE}
  rules:
    - if: '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "develop"'

build_image_etl:
  stage: build_image
  needs: ["njsscan","semgrep","sonarqube-vulnerability-report","retire"]
```

```
  image:
    name: gcr.io/kaniko-project/executor:v1.14.0-debug
    entrypoint: [""]
  script:
    - |
      if [[ -z "${REGISTRY_USER}" || -z "${REGISTRY_PASSWORD}" ]]; then
        REGISTRY_USER=${CI_REGISTRY_USER}
        REGISTRY_PASSWORD=${CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD}
        unset CI_REGISTRY_USER; unset CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD;
      fi
    - |
      if [ -z "${REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH_ETL}" ]; then
        echo "ERROR: CI variable REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH_ETL is mandatory."
        exit 1
      fi
    - REGISTRY=$(echo ${REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH_ETL} | cut -d / -f 1)
    - |
      KANIKO_CONTEXT_DIR_ETL=${CI_PROJECT_DIR}/${CONTEXT_DIR_ETL}
    - mkdir -p /kaniko/.docker
    - |
              echo    "{\"auths\":{\"${REGISTRY}\":{\"auth\":\"$(printf    "%s:%s"
"${REGISTRY_USER}"     "${REGISTRY_PASSWORD}"     |     base64     -w0)\"}}}"     >
/kaniko/.docker/config.json
    - |
      if [ "$(echo ${PUSH_IMAGE} | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')" = "true" ]; then
        PUSH_IMAGE=""
      else
        echo "Info: defer pushing image to remote as PUSH_IMAGE is false"
        PUSH_IMAGE="--no-push"
      fi
    - |
      if [ -n "$EXTRA_TAGS" ]; then
        IMAGE_WITHOUT_TAG=$(echo ${REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH_ETL} | cut -d : -f 1)
        for tag in $EXTRA_TAGS; do
                        KANIKO_EXTRA_TAGS="${KANIKO_EXTRA_TAGS}    --destination
${IMAGE_WITHOUT_TAG}:${tag}"
        done
      fi
    - /kaniko/executor
      --context "${KANIKO_CONTEXT_DIR_ETL}"
      --dockerfile "${KANIKO_CONTEXT_DIR_ETL}/${DOCKER_FILE_NAME}"
      --build-arg optional_dependencies="${BUILD_ARGS}"
     --destination "${REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH_ETL}" ${KANIKO_EXTRA_TAGS} ${PUSH_IMAGE}
  rules:
    - if: '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "develop"'

scan_image_self-security:
  stage: scan_image
```

```
  needs: ["build_image_self-security"]
  image: docker:24
  services:
    - name: docker:24-dind
      alias: docker
  before_script:
    - apk --no-cache add curl python3 py3-pip
                                        -                  curl                  -sfL
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/trivy/main/contrib/install.sh | sh -
s -- -b /usr/local/bin
     - echo $CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD | docker login -u $CI_REGISTRY_USER --password-
stdin $CI_REGISTRY
  script:
    - docker pull "${REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH_SURICATA}:latest"
    - trivy image --exit-code 1 "${REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH_SURICATA}:latest"
  rules:
    - if: '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "develop"'

scan_image_etl:
  stage: scan_image
  needs: ["build_image_etl"]
  image: docker:24
  services:
    - name: docker:24-dind
      alias: docker
  before_script:
    - apk --no-cache add curl python3 py3-pip
                                        -                  curl                  -sfL
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/aquasecurity/trivy/main/contrib/install.sh | sh -
s -- -b /usr/local/bin
     - echo $CI_REGISTRY_PASSWORD | docker login -u $CI_REGISTRY_USER --password-
stdin $CI_REGISTRY
  script:
    - docker pull "${REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH_ETL}:latest"
    - trivy image --exit-code 1 "${REGISTRY_IMAGE_PATH_ETL}:latest"
  rules:
    - if: '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "develop"'

deploy_self-security:
  stage: deploy
  needs: ["build_image_self-security", "scan_image_self-security"]
  script:
    - echo "Deploy self-Security ..."
  rules:
    - if: '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "develop"'

deploy_etl:
  stage: deploy
```

```
  needs: ["build_image_etl", "scan_image_etl"]
  script:
    - echo "Deploy ETL ..."
  rules:
    - if: '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "develop"'

zap_baseline_etl:
  stage: dast
  needs: ["deploy_etl"]
  image: ghcr.io/zaproxy/zaproxy:stable
  script:
    - echo "zap"
  rules:
    - if: '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "develop"'

zap_full_etl:
  stage: dast
  needs: ["deploy_etl"]
  image: ghcr.io/zaproxy/zaproxy:stable
  script:
    - echo "zap"
  rules:
    - if: '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "develop"'

zap_baseline_self-security:
  stage: dast
  needs: ["deploy_self-security"]
  image: ghcr.io/zaproxy/zaproxy:stable
  variables:
    ZAP_TARGET: "http://URL:PORT/"
  before_script:
    - mkdir -p /zap/wrk
  script:
    - zap-baseline.py -t $ZAP_TARGET -g gen.conf -I -x baseline.xml
    - cp /zap/wrk/baseline.xml baseline.xml
  artifacts:
    when: always
    paths:
      - baseline.xml
  rules:
    - if: '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "develop"'

zap_full_self-security:
  stage: dast
  needs: ["deploy_self-security"]
  image: ghcr.io/zaproxy/zaproxy:stable
  variables:
    ZAP_TARGET: "http://URL:PORT/"
```

```
before_script:
  - mkdir -p /zap/wrk
script:
  - zap-full-scan.py -t $ZAP_TARGET -g gen.conf -I -x full-zap.xml
  - cp /zap/wrk/full-zap.xml full-zap.xml
artifacts:
  when: always
  paths:
    - full-zap.xml
rules:
  - if: '$CI_COMMIT_BRANCH == "develop"'
```

B. MLOps questionnaires

In this appendix a MLOps questionnaire has been added for the pilot leaders to answer before the MLOps is implemented in the pilots.

Table 2: General questionnaire

Question ID	Questions
GQ.1	What makes a data point?
GQ.2	What a assumptions exist regarding the used data?
GQ.3	What makes a prediction correct/wrong?
GQ.4	What is the cost of predicting wrongly/gain of predicting correctly?
GQ.5	What are the success criteria for model and system performance?
GQ.6	If measuring your success criteria involves a ground truth of your label, like a label, how does the ground truth get gathered?
GQ.7	If measuring your success criteria involves a ground truth of your label, like a label, does the gathering of the label contradict with the business goals of your use-case?
GQ.8	What is the required quality of service (e.g. availability, latency, resource consumption, throughput)?
GQ.9	What happens if the service is unavailable?
GQ.10	In what computational environment will the service or parts of the service be deployed?
GQ.11	On what computational resources will the service run?
GQ.12	If there are multiple computational domains/devices, how is the communication between done? What happens, if the communication is not available
GQ.13	Based on GQ.5-12, what are the expected operational costs for your application, caused by gathering ground truth, hardware and infrastructure cost, and cost for unavailability and mispredictions?
GQ.14	Based on GQ.4 & 5, what is the expected gain/saving of a model, that fulfills the model performance?
GQ.15	Based on GQ.13 & 14, how is the potential gain/saving reached by fulfilling the success criteria compared to the operational cost?
GQ.16	Based on GQ.13-15, is your application capable of amortizing its expected development cost in a desired time, by the delta of the expected saving/gain and the operational cost? Note: These questions so far do not take into account a profit margin. Development cost includes code maintenance.

Table 3: Backbone questionnaire

Question ID	Module	Building block	Question
BBQ.1	ML Foundation	Data modeller trigger connector	Are all of your data connectors pull?
BBQ.2	ML Foundation	Data connector(s) + Data modeller	Does the combination of data connector(s) and data modeller not model/match/batch/de-batch the input data in any way and are the incoming data already available in a persitent data source outside of this scope?
BBQ.3	ML Foundation	Data schemer	Can you define one or a set of data schemas that characterises a valid data point and do you have the computational resources to do a data schema check for every data input and can the event of data pionts that do not fit the schema handeled in an alternative way? Addition: Data schema here means here data structure and if possible extended by the data types of each data fragment
BBQ.4	ML Foundation	Main switch	Is there a scenario in which you would like to deactivate the AI/ML service and continue to record the raw data or deactivate certain modules of the AI/ML service without un-deploying those to be deactivated modules?
BBQ.5	ML Core	Fallback switch	Is is there a fallback routine possible, for instance a default prediction or no prediction at all, that is better than 100% misprediction?
BBQ.6	ML Core	Feature engineerer	Does the input data require feature engineering before being fed to the model that is something else than feature filtering or feature scaling and are not based on machine learning?
BBQ.7	ML Core	Data validator	Should your model not predict on certain data points, for instance out-of-distribution samples, and there is a fallback routine with which you can handle those cases?
BBQ.8	ML Core	Model inferencer	Is your model stateful?
BBQ.9	ML Core	Anomaly handler	Is there any building block of the follwoing existing: data schemer, fall-back switch, output validator or input validator

BBQ.10	ML Core	Anomaly handler	Should the recieved data points be handled differently depending no their sending building block?
BBQ.11	ML Core	Output validator	Is there aspect, the output should be validated and if it is invalid should be handled differently?
BBQ.12	ML Core	Output switch	Is it desired that the AI/ML Services can be switched from building blocks that require the model to inference?
BBQ.13	ML Core	Output post-processor	Does your model prediction require a post-processing to be consumable to target services
BBQ.14	ML Foundation & ML Core	All sorts of switches if existing	What should happen if the switches are deactivated/activated?
BBQ.15	ML Auxilliaries	Message Broker	Are you using a broker based communication protocoll?
BBQ.16	ML Auxilliaries	Message Broker	Is your service in that sense critical, that even when the consuming service/hardware is disconnected from the continuum the AI service should still be available
BBQ.17	ML Auxilliaries	Raw data database	Do you have the computational resources to store reasonable amounts of data ingested to your service and is the ingested data not anyway easily available from the data fabric for longer term.
BBQ.18	ML Auxilliaries	Audit database	A) Do you have the computational resources to store reasonable amounts of data ingested to your service and it is desired to be able to verify the prediction made for instance for deeper analysis during the lifetime or for proofing to auditing instances in case of caused damage? or B) You want to have a module in the offline configuration
BBQ.19	ML Auxilliaries	All trigger APIs	Do you have any modules that are in "offline" configuration?

BBQ.20	ML Auxilliaries	Explainer API	Do you have the ML explainer module in place and do you want to have the explanations available to the outside
BBQ.21	ML Auxilliaries	Drift alert API	Should the drift alert should be forwarded to any external service/user
BBQ.22	ML Auxilliaries	Performance API	Is there a performance calculated that should be communicated to an external service/consumer
BBQ.23	ML Auxilliaries	Performance Alert API	Is there a performance calculated that can cause a alert, if the performance is too low, and should be communicated to an external service/consumer
BBQ.24	ML Auxilliaries	Feedback connector	Is there any type of label or feedback existing that should be added to the database for future trainings or performance evaluations
BBQ.25	ML Auxilliaries	Oracle/Labeler API	Do you have an smart sampler module that selects certain data point that shall get a label/feedback or do you want to get the ground truth for all data points?
BBQ.26	ML Auxilliaries	Switch trigger connector	Do there any building blocks exist, that are switches, and it is desired, that somewhat form outside the Backbone can activate/deactivate (one of) them
BBQ.27	ML Performance Monitor	General	Is it possible and desireable to calculate a performance for your model/ML System?
BBQ.28	ML Performance Monitor	Model performance evaluator	Is it possible and desired to calculate or estimate at least one performance metric for the model performance Clarification: With performance metric we mean any metric that evaluates the relationship between model predictions and the ground truth/achieved rewards
BBQ.29	ML Performance Monitor	Service Performance Evaluator	Is it possible and desired to calculate or estimate at least one performance metric for the model performance and does the performance of the model always exactly reflect the performance of the AI/ML service? Clarification: With performance metric we mean any metric that evaluates the relationship between model predictions and the ground truth/achieved rewards

BBQ.30	ML Performance Monitor	Performance watchdog	Is there a minimal desired/required performance for one of the existing performance metrics and an alert shall be raised if the performance is not met?
BBQ.31	ML Smart sampler	Ground truth sampler	Exists there an ground truth that is not self-revealing (label or reward) that only shall be acquired by an external oracle for a fraction of the incomming data points?
BBQ.32	ML Drift detector	General	Is your environment guaranteed static or it is possible to immediate calculate the model/system performance?
BBQ.33	ML Drift detector	Input data drift detector	Is it possible that the distribution of input data drifts over time and an exact (enough) and immediate performance calculation is not possible?
BBQ.34	ML Drift detector	Predictions drift detector	Is it possible that the distribution of input data drifts over time and an exact (enough) and immediate performance calculation is not possible and (an drift detection of the input data is not feasible or the model performance strongly depends on the class/prediction range)
BBQ.35	ML Drift detector	Model properties drift detector	Is it possible that the distribution of input data drifts over time and an exact (enough) and immediate performance calculation is not possible and (your model has certain properties that depend on the distribution of the input/output data)?
BBQ.36	ML Drift detector	Intepretations drift detector	Is it possible that the distribution of input data drifts over time and an exact (enough) and immediate performance calculation is not possible and you have an ML explainer module?
BBQ.37	ML Drift detector	General	If you answered multiple questions about drift detectors with yes, can you experimentally identify a subset of selected drift detectors, that sufficiently detects all expected drifts?
BBQ.38	ML Drift detector	Drift watchdog	If one drift detector building block exists and one or more drifts are detected, shall there be a trigger be sent?
BBQ.39	ML Explainer	Explainer	Is it desired to calculate for all or certain data points a explanations for the model prediction?
BBQ.40	ML Trainer	Continous training pipeline	Is your completely model static over time? Explanation: Static model in this regards means, that the model will always be the same model with the same model parameters, as it is for instance a foundational model

BBQ.41	ML Shadow	General	Is it desired to do online A/B testing for challenger version of the ML core, mirror the inference pipeline, or are you currently still under development of the AI/ML Service and want to make the service do a shadow run?
BBQ.42	ML Shadow	Shadow audit database	ML Shadow mirroring scenario: Is it unfeasible to have a proper audit database on the executing computational resource yet other modules, executed on another computational resource, need its content as input
BBQ.43	ML Auxilliaries	Model meta data store	Is it desired or functional, that trained models can be tracked in regards it's training parameters, dataset properties, performances, etc.
BBQ.44	ML Auxilliaries	Artifact store	Is it desired or functional, that artifacts of the training are stored?

Table 4: MLOps pipeline questionnaire

Question ID	Training pipeline type	Building block	Question
TQ.1	Both	General	Is your training pipelines using either training with a a priori dataset, or learning with an interactive environment or both?
TQ.2	Training with dataset	Dataset generating	Does your training rely on any generated/simulated?
TQ.3	Training with dataset	Raw data database, Raw data loading	Is it desired/required and possible, that your training data are persistent over time?
TQ.4	Both	Data scheming	A) Can you define one or a set of data schemas that characterizes a valid data point and do you have the computational resources to do a data schema check for every data input? If A) yes: B) How is your system supposed to handle invalid data points? Addition: Data schema here means here data structure and if possible extended by the data types of each data fragment
TQ.5	Both	Feature engineering	Is any kind of transformation of your raw data desired?

TQ.6	Both	Data validating	Are there assumptions in regards of the features that can be verified and/or is it desired that certain points that are too far away from the dataset distribution are not predicted, e.g. outliers.
TQ.7	Training with dataset	Data splitting	Is there enough data/Is it desired, to execute besides the training also additional evaluation/validation/or post-processing steps that require seperated data?
TQ.8	Both	Model post-processing	Is it desired to change certain properties of the models after the training, e.g. calibration, model pruning, model quantization, adaption of threshold
TQ.9	Both	Performance evaluating	Is there a performance requirement regarding the model and the complete systems that shall be fulfilled?
TQ.10	Both	Model validating	Are there additional model related properties besides the performance that should be evaluated to fulfil additional requirements?
TQ.11	Both	Federated learning exchange	Does your training involve forms of federated learning?
TQ.12	Both	Artifact packaging	Is it required to convert or package any of the created artifacts to make them executable in the deployment environment?